Listening this afternoon to Tchaikovsky’s Orchestral Suite No. 3 I was reminded of its publication as recently as 1885. The majestic images of the The Year 1812 Solemn Overture, Op. 49 were brought to mind as well. Subsequently I listened to Shostakovich’s sometimes ominous but always hopeful compositions which pointedly arose from his birth around 1905 coinciding with the first Russian Revolution. Between those two composers and between those two dates was a history of courtiers and revolutionaries. Things changed rapidly within a relatively short period of time.
Regarding matters closer to home is the evolution of events in England. My interest is however not confined to Anglo-Saxon influence but rather more particularly the start of what I consider the legal process of government. One need only recall the unfolding of events in George Orwell’s Animal Farm, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World or William Golding’s Lord of the Flies to appreciate the mountainous ambition of the Lords and Vassals over 800 years ago.
The vehicle most commonly denoted to describe this elemental form of government (or democracy) was a constitution.
Magna Carta and contemporary constitutional change
“On 15 June 1215 – or thereabouts – at Runnymede meadow, lying between Windsor and Staines, King John came to an agreement with a group of subjects who had been rebelling against him. It is now known as Magna Carta.”
“The so-called Whig theory of history depicted a steady progression through which the unique English values of individual freedom, inherent from the outset, progressively unfolded. Magna Carta often figured in such narratives. Yet in truth its appearance was not a placid event. It was the product of a rebellion against King John by his subjects. They objected to the methods of the Angevin dynasty in general, including a tendency to manipulate justice, expand royal land and place stringent financial demands upon their subjects, and the particularly provocative version of these practices that John pursued. A threat of French invasion lurked at the same time, further forcing John’s hand to concede to the demands of those he ruled that he bind himself to behaving differently in future.”
Excerpt(s) et sequi from
Magna Carta and contemporary constitutional change
Andrew Blick
A constitution is normally distinguished by its fundamental principles or established precedents. The alliance with historic behaviour was as important as its putative ambition for advancement. But it is no accident that one’s personal constitution equates to one’s character or physical state. It is a reminder of the inescapability of our composition. This perilous course does not usually succeed to contaminate the purer, axiomatic or more mathematic influence of the legal constitution.
Interestingly Britain lacks a codified constitution; whereas in the United States of America the Constitution (the basic written set of principles and precedents of federal government) came into operation in 1789 and has since been modified by twenty-six amendments.
“Rather than a written constitution, the ultimate source of legal authority was an institution: Parliament. According to a doctrine often known as ‘parliamentary sovereignty’, the Westminster legislature could do or undo anything subject only to self-restraint and practical realities, and not the terms of a constitutional text. Though it was once the central guarantor of Magna Carta, Parliament began to turn on it, and starting in 1863 began repealing most of Magna Carta through a series of consolidation acts. Today, the only provisions initially found in the 1215 text that remain in effect are those relating to the freedom of the church, those protecting municipal rights, and the provisions that were at first contained in chapters 39 and 40, involving due process and access to the law.”
Perhaps it is significant the New World American colonials embraced the Latin meaning of the word, constituere ‘establish, appoint’. The account of most human conduct includes the establishment of principles and the appointment of leadership. The ultimate purpose of the constitution is government by consent; that is, benefit from the top down. Yet seemingly there remains a battle for superiority or paramountcy by the Crown, the Protectorate, the Pope on the one side and the Parliament, the Congress and the people on the other. And the ones who are pressing most notably for priority are often the ones to be feared the most; whether the entitlement is claimed by Napoleon or Hitler.
“The process by which Magna Carta came into being is also instructive. A relatively broad grouping, including barony, Londoners, clergy and others further down the social scale, combined to force upon John a different way of operating. The breadth of this coalition gave the text – though issued by John in his own name – a legitimacy that a more exclusive exercise would not have done. It was also helpful to Magna Carta that its various provisions served the requirements of numerous groups that therefore had a material interest in its maintenance once it returned after the initial papal annulment of August 1215. This inclusive basis to some extent anticipated the later concept of popular sovereignty, reflecting a sense that fundamental rules should rest on an exceptional degree of consent. In this sense the process leading to Magna Carta resembled a constitutional convention, a gathering convened to create a new constitutional text. The way in which the drafting of Magna Carta seems to have taken place – involving prolonged discussions between rebels and the royal camp, taking expert advice and considering evidence – is a further similarity with the kind of practices associated with a constitutional convention.”